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Rewriting the architecture of mediation
Al-Ahram Weekly
4-10 Decmber 2025
Rewriting the architecture of mediation
Dr. Mohamed Ihsan
Thursday 4 Dec 2025
Mediation in the international system is now more distributed, more competitive, and more dependent on regional legitimacy than ever before, with important implications for global diplomacy, writes Mohamed Ihsan
For much of the post-Cold War period, the United States, Europe, and multilateral institutions such as the United Nations defined the boundaries of diplomatic intervention. They set the terms, organised the negotiating tables, and shaped the compromises.
Today, the centre of gravity is shifting. Mediation is increasingly being driven by regional actors, middle powers, and strategically ambitious states, above all Qatar, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, whose proximity, access, and credibility in local arenas give them a kind of influence that distant superpowers, can no longer easily wield.
Nowhere is this more visible than in the Gaza conflict, where the emerging diplomatic landscape reflects not an improvised response to crisis but a deeper structural reordering of global politics.
This transformation is marked by several tensions that do not cancel each other out but rather define the texture of contemporary diplomacy: the balance between neutrality and national interest, the interplay of legitimacy and vulnerability, and the constant negotiation between stabilising a region and inadvertently fragmenting its political environment.
Together, these dynamics reveal an international system in which mediation is more distributed, more competitive, and more dependent on regional legitimacy than in previous decades.
A useful starting point is the nature of the power now exercised by regional mediators. Unlike the great powers, whose influence traditionally rested on military capacity or institutional dominance, the new mediators operate through hybrid forms of leverage: proximity, intelligence networks, financial tools, and the ability to engage directly with non-state armed groups.
Qatar and Egypt illustrate two distinct but complementary models of this approach. Qatar’s strength derives from its financial resources, its diplomatic agility, and its longstanding contacts with actors such as Hamas and the Taliban. Its foreign-policy machinery is built to negotiate, and its political identity is closely tied to mediation.
Egypt, by contrast, draws on a different kind of capital. Its authority is rooted in history, geography, and institutional memory. For decades Cairo has been at the centre of Arab diplomacy on Palestine and the wider region. Its intelligence services maintain channels of communication that no external power can replicate.
The Rafah Crossing with Gaza gives Egypt leverage that is both practical and symbolic. Its experience in negotiating ceasefires, prisoner exchanges, and de-escalation mechanisms provides a depth of credibility that cannot be purchased. In many regional crises, Egypt acts less as a broker and more as an anchor and an actor whose involvement signals seriousness and whose absence would create a vacuum.
These assets, however, sit alongside constraints. States that depend on diplomatic agility rather than military heft can be stretched thin. Their credibility can fluctuate rapidly. The same proximity that enhances their access to local actors also exposes them to reputational risk and political backlash. Legitimacy in this environment is a fragile commodity, shaped by perception as much as performance.
This fragility is particularly visible in the Gaza negotiations. Qatar’s channels to Hamas allow it to play a unique role in ceasefire arrangements and hostage negotiations, yet those same links make it vulnerable to criticism from governments that question the neutrality of its approach.
Egypt faces its own difficulties. While its strategic location and longstanding networks give it unmatched leverage, it must constantly balance its mediation role with its security concerns in Sinai, its relations with Israel, and the political expectations of its regional and international partners. Even minor adjustments in negotiating proposals can be interpreted as bias, creating pressure points that require constant diplomatic management.
Saudi Arabia and the UAE are also expanding their mediation profiles as part of a broader diplomatic repositioning. Riyadh’s outreach to Iran, its involvement in Sudan, and its emerging role in Gaza reflect an ambition to translate economic and political weight into diplomatic influence.
Oman maintains its tradition of quiet facilitation, while the UAE increasingly links mediation to development financing and post-conflict reconstruction. The result is a crowded diplomatic field in which several states operate simultaneously, sometimes cooperatively and sometimes competitively. This diversity of actors offers flexibility but also risks fragmentation if parallel tracks pull in different directions.
Within this system, regional mediators employ a blend of formal and informal tools. Qatar has invested in specialised mediation units and technical teams; Egypt often relies on intelligence channels and long-standing personal networks; Saudi Arabia uses its financial clout to shape negotiating environments. Economic incentives such as reconstruction funds, humanitarian access, development pledges are increasingly used as diplomatic currency. This mixture of institution-building and personalised diplomacy allows regional actors to manoeuvre quickly, but it also leaves them vulnerable when political circumstances shift.
The Gaza conflict has been a revealing laboratory for these dynamics. Qatar’s ability to maintain dialogue with Hamas has made it indispensable in negotiating temporary pauses and hostage releases. Its financial pledges for reconstruction act as leverage, even as they expose it to external scrutiny.
Egypt’s mediation has been equally central, not only in arranging ceasefires but in discussing the political architecture of Gaza’s future. Cairo’s broader strategic interest in preventing instability from spilling across its borders and ensuring that post-conflict governance aligns with regional security considerations makes its role unavoidable. The two states often coordinate closely, though not always seamlessly, reflecting the inherent complexity of multi-actor mediation.
This new mediation order has several implications for global diplomacy. As regional powers acquire greater legitimacy and access, traditional actors may find themselves less central to negotiations, especially in conflicts where local trust outweighs global influence.
New norms of mediation are emerging: who is considered an acceptable interlocutor; how backchannel diplomacy integrates with formal negotiations; and how humanitarian aid and reconstruction funds intersect with political arrangements.
Yet, increased regional involvement also produces new vulnerabilities. Smaller states can quickly become targets of political pressure. Their efforts to stabilise one arena may inadvertently disturb another. The absence of a single overarching framework sometimes leads to overlapping initiatives that are more competitive than complementary.
Critics warn that regional mediators lack the coercive tools necessary to enforce lasting settlements. Others argue that neutrality is illusory, since every state brings its own strategic calculations. Capacity limitations can slow progress, and heavy reliance on personal networks can make mediation fragile. Still, for all these critiques, the system that is emerging is not simply a stopgap. It reflects a redistribution of diplomatic authority shaped by geography, access, and credibility.
What remains uncertain is whether this new generation of mediators can move from securing temporary ceasefires to shaping durable political arrangements. The challenge ahead is not only managing crises but building the institutional frameworks in the form of governance mechanisms, reconstruction plans, security guarantees that can turn fragile truces into sustainable peace.
As Gaza demonstrates, the states that now sit at the mediation table will help define the political trajectories of regional conflicts and, increasingly, the wider architecture of international peacebuilding.
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* The writer is a senior visiting professor at the Yale University-Jackson School for Global Affairs. In 2025, he was elected secretary general of the Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity Organisation (AAPSO).
