|
Prelude
It should be maintained that the US enjoyed very little support for
the invasion of Iraq from national, regional and international
public opinion, and its military campaign whose real aim had never
been declared, was not assisted by indigenous rebel forces. These
factors and the national apprehension of foreign domination invoked
by memories of the British occupation under the guise of being
liberator during the First World War, had distinctive implications
for postwar political reconstruction of that country. Furthermore,
with the old state mechanism, including its army and security forces
ousted from power, the vacuum of political authority as well as law
and order was left to the whim of feuding factions whose primary aim
was grabbing the power.
The first weeks of America's postwar engagement in Iraq were chaotic
and ineffectual with most of the treasures and infrastructure of the
country, including the Museums, Libraries and Cultural Archives,
were systematically looted, sabotaged and destroyed while American
troops stood by, except for the Ministry of Oil which was well
guarded by the American military. When Paul Bremer III, the US
Administrator, landed in Iraq on May 13th.,2003, he started his
mission by dissolving the Iraqi army and security forces before
introducing any plan for reshaping Iraq's politics and economy. At a
later date, he and his Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) that
had extensive British participation, initiated the establishment of
a 25-member Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) made up mainly of
US-British own chosen exiled and immigrant Iraqis, but granted them
no real functions. When the UN Security Council set December
15th.2003, as a deadline for delivering a plan and timetable for the
constitutional transition, Bremer pressed IGC which was plagued with
internal divisions along philosophical, ethnic and
sectarian/religious lines, to agree on a formula. The IGC ultimately
agreed on a plan, termed the November 15 Agreement, setting June
30th.2004, as the date for ending occupation while adopting a
Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) which is, in essence, an
interim constitution that would structure a power for roughly 18
months, ending by 31 December 2005.
The formal recognition of the occupation of Iraq by UN Resolution
1483 adopted on May 22nd.2003 along with the process of dissolving
the army, stimulated a sense of nationalism as the Iraqis in general
realized that it was an American conquest and domination of their
country, a situation that augmented indigenous resistance and led to
questioning every move made by the US Administrator and the CPA. As
such, when the CPA, under the influence of the US Administrator,
stipulated that by 31 May, 2004, a 15-member organizing committee in
each of Iraq's 18 provinces would be established to select members
of a provincial caucus for electing representatives to a
Transitional National Assembly (TNA), the proposal was over-ruled
under the pressure of the top religious Shia' theocratic leader,
Sistani, who insisted on having a directly elected national
Assembly. The efforts made by the UN envoy to convince Sistani that
a reasonably credible election could not be organized in such a
short period and in the prevailing atmosphere, failed.
As some Iraqi politicians observed, it was not possible
administratively to organize an ideally conceived election within a
short period of the occupation because there was no reliable voter
rolls, no electoral laws, and no institutions for independent and
credible management of the electoral process. It should have been
predicted that premature national elections would favor radical
religious forces that had already been organized and supported by
strong militias some of which were constituted in neighboring
countries such as Iran long before the invasion, while secular and
moderate independent political forces needed more time to organize
themselves and campaign effectively. Probably, holding local
elections as a first step would have paved the way for new political
parties to spread their message and allow new leadership to emerge
Direct election in most provinces took place at ease and an elected
assembly was summoned to draft a constitution by August, 2005, for
approval via a referendum to be held in October, 2005. That process
served the purpose for the large religious and well organized ethnic
groups' leaderships to be in charge because of their ultimate
influence and hold, emotionally and otherwise on their constituents
and mainly uneducated followers, since the concepts of political
culture have long since ceased in the country due to the former
totalitarian regime's negative attitude toward human rights even
when the US was its close ally. In the meantime, continuing
terrorist and insurgent violence escalated and obstructed not only
the election process in many parts of the country but also the
economic build up and re-construction process.
The Current Situation
The optimism of the US Administration regarding the democratic
changes in Iraq has no basis. A house of representatives (the
Assembly), designed in the TAL as a democratic institution to draft
the Constitution was in reality an artificially constructed assembly
of ethnic and sectarian voting blocks, hence reflected in a way the
tyranny of the majority operating under the sponsorship of an
elected legislature.
The only positive result of the US 2003 war on Iraq was definitely
ridding the country of the tyranny of Saddam's regime, bringing
about an irreversible transformation of politics but without
consolidating the power for a State. To elaborate on this point, one
has to recognize that the Constitutional Commission selected by the
Assembly had been mainly symbolic, and hence did not encourage a
broad national dialogue that is crucial to enhancing stability and
protecting the country's unity. Transparency and adequate public
participation has also been missing in writing the Constitution,
since debate and consultation on a wide range was not practiced.
Furthermore, marginalizing other political groups including pan-Arab
nationalist movements and the old ruling party followers may have
blocked the emerging of a powerful secular gathering that could
translate the definition of democracy into more appropriate
procedural manner for the Constitution.
In reviewing the draft Constitution, one may detect that the power
was not distributed on an agreed and equitable basis for a strong
central state while promoting adequate provincial autonomy that
avoids any major imbalance or demographic changes within the
country. Such changes, if taking place, may encourage Iraq's
neighbors, such as Iran and Turkey to fill the vacuum by proxy,
hence turning the dream of a democratic reborn Iraq into a dystrophy
of warring militias. As a matter of fact, Iran has already been
implicated as an effective supporter of certain sectarian militias
involved in retaliatory paramilitary measures while revealing its
concerned favoritism for the southern region of Iraq, and Turkey
made its views very clear for protecting the rights of the Turkoman
population in northern Iraq.
The text of the Constitution includes contradicting statements and
even ambiguous remarks as far as the principles and implementation
of democracy and the federalism are concerned. As such, different
interpretations elaborating on the responsibilities and procedural
approach for applying those principles have already created tension
and may threaten the very existence of the state. All signs suggest
that this constitution, if it is not radically amended will further
weaken the already shaken central Iraqi state. The following
paragraphs explain this notion briefly:
1. The Constitution gave religion (Islam) a significant role in the
state affairs, granting its clergy a formal guidance responsibility
with jurists supervising the Federal Court system. Hence the basic
characteristic of secular democracy including human rights, in
particular woman's liberation is being contested.
2. The Constitution sets the stage for a loose federal system with
weak or constrained central government and strongly pronounced
autonomy to the federated regions already agreed upon, than TAL
sought. Furthermore, it allows the formation of more federated
states out of existing provinces at any time in the future. This
situation will provide significant areas of conflict within the
country. The TAL echoed the logical approach of Iraqi intelligentsia
for designating the major Kurdish speaking northern areas to be a
federated region but with unchallenging autonomy.
3. To implement decentralization as suggested by the Constitution,
the Kurds are adamant on transforming considerable executive,
legislative and judicial power to their region's autonomy. Of course
their region has already been a de-facto separate state for all
practical purposes with its own army/militia and budget under the
Anglo-US military protection since 1992. But they are pushing to
extend its boundaries at the expense of others. Still their real
challenge to the central state may be noted in their own recently
approved regional constitution whose provisions call for an autonomy
befitting a confederate state and stipulate for a vote on full
Kurdish independence to be carried out within eight years.
4. The constitution is not very clear about the prerogatives of the
regional administrations of the federated states vis-à-vis that of
the central government in respect to crucially important matters
such as security, foreign trade and cultural relationship, and
natural resources. The management of oil and gas resources, for
example, whose revenue had been representing about 90% of the whole
country's total revenue, is not clearly defined, and definitely may
create serious friction if it is dealt with by the regional
administrations, as this may lead to impoverishing areas that have
no such resource, and may even complicate the work of international
oil corporations seeking oil exploration investments in the country.
The Interim governments have failed so far to provide security and
services to the population in general. It has been perceived by the
masses as an incompetent and corrupt US puppet entity operating with
minimal transparency. Recently, senior figures in the US
Administration (including Mr. Ramsfeld) admitted that corruption is
wide spread not only among members of the Interim Government, but
also among the US personnel. Investigation regarding embezzlement or
irregularities of US staff and contracting companies is being
pursued by the US Congress.
Politics And The Social Structure Of The Population Of Iraq
Different ethnicities and religious sects who managed to assimilate
within one state before, seem now not in a position to emphasize the
equality of citizenship. Their anxiety for a federal system is
stimulated mainly by their past hostility toward the central
government, and the new Constitution became their vehicle to reflect
that. In this respect, it is important to underline briefly some
facts regarding the structure of the population of Iraq,in the
following paragraphs:
(a) The main ethnic groups in Iraq are: Arabs who represent about
80% of the population; Kurds who represent about 15-18%; Turkomans
and other ethnicities who probably represent 3-5%. However, it
should be recalled that there has been no actual census covering the
whole country since 1957 to verify these figures.
(b) The Arabs in general are Semitic but not the Kurds or the
Turkomans. The overwhelming majority of these three ethnicities are
Muslims. The majority of the Arab Muslims belong to the Shi'a sect
while the rest belong to different Sunni sects. The overwhelming
majority of the Kurds and the Turkomans are Sunni Muslims while the
rest are Shi'a Muslims. Intermarriage among these three ethnic
groups of different sects is not uncommon. Christians and followers
of other religious cults are either Arabs, Kurds or of other
ethnicities.
(c) Since the establishment of the modern state of Iraq in the
1920s, a sense of belonging to the country started to develop,
strengthened by officially established national institutions
including schools and the army, both of which helped in driving
allegiance away from the tribal and religious leaderships of the
past to the nation, thus setting the stage for initiating secular
political parties with different ideologies and modes for democratic
culture. In the meantime the education level and civil society
institutions as well as women's liberation movements grew at a high
pace, and public services as well as the economy and local security
reached the highest level among the countries within the region. But
since 1968,with Saddam's group taking over, such progress started to
wane slowly.
(d) During the short history of modern Iraq, aside from personal and
tribal feuds, no record of armed conflict was ever reported between
ethnic or religious groups, and most uprisings and armed revolts
were directed toward the central government. It should be emphasized
here that the theological doctrine of the Shi'a and the Sunni
denounces the principle of separating the state and religion. The
difference between the two lies in the degree of influence exercised
by the religious clergy over the state, which is more pronounced and
insisted upon by the Ja'fari Shi'a theology whose followers are
dominant in Iraq, Iran and Lebanon.
The initial US approach to the political process led to the current
problem by reinforcing the sectarian based model in Iraq as it
imposed religion and ethnic quotas for the formation of the interim
government where politicians identify themselves in ethnic or
sectarian terms rather than with issues related to the principles of
democracy and the mechanism of election, women rights, the essence
of the federation system, national identity, etc…
The Muslim Shi'a religious parties have formed an alliance among
themselves seeking a Shi'a-run Islamic state which they believe is a
natural resultant of their majority in the country. Their sectarian
loyalties underline democratic transition as a way to over-rule the
embittered Muslim Sunni minority while besieging the secular
society. To achieve that at ease, they needed the support of other
tangible factions. Hence they negotiated with the Kurds, who are in
the main for a secular regional state of their own in the north. The
two sides formed a tactical front or coalition to control the
interim government and support the Constitution as it was written,
with obvious reluctance to any major alteration to its text that
might limit or affect either side's aspiration. Compromising on
critical issues is yet to emerge as a sign of their continued
cooperation. Without synchronizing their long term plans,
involuntary unannounced concessions are being made in certain areas.
Already the Iraqi army and security units are made up mainly of
Shi'a and Kurdish militias who may play a role in any emerging civil
conflict. Other non positive aspects of this cooperation may be
noted in the fact that critically needed civil servants have been
replaced with less qualified members of the ruling coalition who are
mainly representing the Shi'a and Kurdish parties. The US
Administration has refrained from condemning such activities openly,
thus casting doubt on its claim to build a democratic state in Iraq,
especially in view of its stance to sanction the Palestinian
territories for having elected a legislative assembly that rejects
Israeli's occupation.
Already the UN and human rights groups have implicated the
government forces and associated parliamentary units and their
militias in human rights violations including judicial killings and
unlawful detention as well as bad treatment of prisoners. The
Jadiria detainment camp of the Government became a symbol of such
unlawful behavior as was the US detainment prison of Abu Ghraib in
Baghdad and the brutality inflicted on the civilians by the British
troops in Basra.
What a Price Iraq:
The US led war on Iraq, starting with the invasion, continued to
inflict horror upon Iraqi civilians, especially in later periods
when the drive against the insurgency elements annihilated severely
the innocent city population. According to some US officers (like
James Alles, commander of the Marine Air Group III), upgraded
version of napalm was used against the Iraqi army. Firing white
phosphorous and depleted uranium, cluster bombs and even bombs with
poisonous gas were part of the offensive weaponry utilized by the US
army, not only during the invasion battles, but also on populated
cities such as Felluja and Ramadi where scores of civilians were
killed or permanently disabled, while pursuing the insurgents.
Inhuman treatment of prisoners including torturing and ruthless
methods of interrogation, and offending the faith of those suspected
of collaboration with the insurgents indicated that the US soldiers
have not fought their battles with high morals. In this respect the
UN Commission on Human Rights appealed to the international
community to stop the massacres and mass killing of civilians in
Iraq. But the US government did not even express regret. Rather it
defended all methods with the notion that their troops are
countering acts of terrorism. Albert Gonzales, the current US
Attorney General made a point that the normal rules of warfare are
suspended when fighting terrorism, and Donald Ramsfeld, the US
Secretary of Defense asserted that the Geneva Convention rules on
warfare does not apply when countering terrorism. Vice President,
Dick Chaney, publicly insists that the CIA be exempted from the ban
on "cruel, inhuman, and degrading" treatment of prisoners. Such
declarations encouraged the US military to apply extreme forms of
torture because they know they are going to evade direct legal
responsibility as dictated by the International Court of Justice,
especially since the US declined to be a signatory to it unless US
citizens are exempted from its jurisdiction. Of course the US
military arranged to court marshal some of its offending officers
and troops whose action had been internationally publicized, but
gave them relatively light sentences even when their crimes against
humanity in Iraq were so monstrous, including murders.
Iraqi intelligentsia is widely disappointed with the behavior of the
US personnel, some of whom had imposed humility and showed other
disrespectful behavior to the people of the country. Imposing a
political status by harsh treatment and causing loss of lives can
not be justified if the invasion pursued presumably to rid the
country of a totalitarian regime without preparing adequately for
the post-war rehabilitation of the country. A surge of
anti-Americanism is being developed not only as a result of US army
behavior and unilateralism and selectiveness regarding the
democratization process, or even its self interest in the Middle
East oil. Rather it is associated with the fear that the ambiguity
of the US geopolitical interest in the whole Middle East region
might result in a break up of Iraq or having it descend into anarchy
in the long run.
Dissolving the army is seen as a pre-planned event by the US, and
the biggest mistake made as admitted by Bremer, not only because it
created an atmosphere of ill feeling among those who lost their jobs
or for creating a vacuum that denounces law and order, but also
because the army as an institutional symbol set the norm of
patriotism in the country. Furthermore, as an establishment, it was
staffed not only with well trained troops, some of whom may have
been loyal to the old regime, but also with highly qualified
engineers, physicians, scientists, and administrators who represent
great assets to the future of Iraq. The absence of genuine national
security forces ever since the dismantling of the army, have added
to the dilemma of the Interim Central government who in turn failed
to provide the appropriate services that may bring about a good
level of coherence and stability for the population in general. The
uneven evolution of the new Iraqi army and police force which is
plagued with factionalism and mistrust, have given a boost to the
insurgency whose activities may escalate with more terror, brutality
and destruction to the nation.
The US has been talking about democracy, but ignored justice and
people's aspiration for freedom and dreams of perusing their
destiny. Smashing away human rights in the region during the period
of the cold war by trumpeting the danger of communism while
supporting Israel's expansion and cleansing approach with harsh
treatment of the Palestinians to drive them away from their land
which they have inhibited for almost two thousand years, raise a lot
of questions regarding the American principles on liberty and human
rights. The same notion may be detected in the US policy when
trumpeting the sectarian and brutal nature of Saddam Hussain's
regime beside his weapons of mass destruction and threats to the
civilized world since 1990, but not before when he was fighting Iran
to the satisfaction of the US Administration. Of course, the US now
collects the fruits of that strategy not only with escalated cost of
life and wealth to maintain its position in Iraq, but also with a
new but much wider sectarian struggle supported by Iran's covert
activities which forced the US to confer with the Iranian government
to dissolve its interference.
Different militias definitely present a most serious challenge to
the legitimacy and stability of the emerging state. It goes without
saying, that Al-Qaeda and their associates, including some of the
old regime's followers, in particular those who provide the
effective military and intelligence capacity, and some fanatic Sunni
faction's conscious about loosing their prestigious status of the
past, are responsible for the rising tension and the severe
violations of human rights. But the same can be said about other
militants, including those who are alien to Iraq or being supported
by neighboring countries such as Israel, Iran and even some Arab
countries such as Kuwait, for the sake of maintaining instability
and augmenting the anarchy that instigated the slaughter of the
education and scientific system when a great number of learned and
well trained professionals and scientists were eliminated or had to
leave the country. The uneven evolution of the new Iraqi army and
police force which is plagued with factionalism and mistrust, have
given a boost to the insurgency and the sectarian terrorizing
conflict including vengeance stance.
Concluding Remarks
The US initiative to invade Iraq was definitely an outright
violation of the latter's integrity as a nation and also of the UN
Charter. Reasons cited by the US Administration for pursuing such
action were numerous, with the emphasis shifting from one to the
other as the case for support merited. As it had been revealed, no
legitimate basis for the invasion could stand to reason except for
changing the former regime who challenged the US hegemony, in order
to install a political system, presumably democratic in nature, that
will accommodate the US long term strategies within the region and
ascertaining its position as the only international super power.
Planning the invasion had been a long awaited task formulated in the
1990s by a group of influential Zionists within the US
Administration who found an attentive ear in the neo-Conservative
hierarchy after September 11, 2001. That invasion was finally
implemented. But the US Administration did not pave the ground for
the post invasion period with an in- depth assessment of the Iraqi
social structure relying mainly on minute intelligence exercise and
hearsay information provided by anxious Iraqi exiles. Thus no clear
vision of an appropriate political system emerged except by name,
confusing the issue and the meaning of democracy with elections'
poll. Still, legitimate election's results should be respected as a
first step in conce iving the principle of democracy.
The mainly US supported exile politicians and opportunists who had
little in common with the citizenship of the country made use of the
compromising stance of the US Administration on the democratic
system being pursued. Misuse of power by US Administration's
assigned Iraqi personnel who were involved in reviving autocracy and
stimulating prejudice has been another problem to cope up with in
correcting the notion of a democratic federal system to be pursued.
The stalemate for almost four months since electing the legislative
assembly, in forming a government that might be stable and strong
enough to rehabilitate the national identity and pave the way for
foreign troops withdrawal, illustrate the magnitude of the dilemma
facing the new republic.
A true dialogue and consensus of all factions regarding federalism
and the role of religion in public life ought to be a first step
while reviewing and amending the Constitution. As a prerequisite to
such an approach, security has to be attended to from the outset. Of
course there is a compelling need for the creation of jobs, and this
could have been attained rapidly, and probably better, if pursued
effectively on a regional basis while executing properly repair and
reconstruction contracts by involving a wide range of Iraqi
contractors instead of through the big US corporations. Improving
essential service infrastructure such as electricity and fuel
supply, water and communication systems ought to have been a
priority. But a major assignment of great importance to achieving
national development would be to eliminate the burdens of reparation
of the former regime's wars and accumulated debts.
The American claim of victory in installing democracy is refuted by
the argument that democracy could not be imposed from outside,
because democracy is a culture that needs to be developed slowly
from within and requires tranquility and unity of purpose. Still,
one has to admit that national reconciliation and unification may
not be attended easily if the US army withdraws and lets the current
ethnic and sectarian polarization continue.
-----
* Professor of Chemical Engineering at the college of Engineering,
the University of Baghdad (1960-1968), Regional Advisor on
Industrial Development in the Arab Middle Eastern Countries
(stationed in Beirut), then Head of the Arab Countries Technical
Cooperation Program of the United Nations Industrial Development
Organization in Vienna (1973-1990).
**Selected excerpts from articles published by many Western writers
were incorporated in the text. List of references includes books:
(Against All Enemies by Richard Clarks; Secrets & Lies by Dilip Hiro;
The Good Fight by Ralf Nadir), and reports published by renown
institutes and writers including: (Iraq Focus-Mena Associates, March
2005; Iraq in Transition-Middle East Program, September 2004; Iraq's
Southern Region--Horizon, December 2005; A Report on Mid-Euphrates
Regional Conference, Najaf 2005; Syria/Iran & the Power Plays over
Iraq-Political Intelligence Report, October 2005; Moving Targets by
Seymour Hersh, the New Yorker December 2003; Building Democracy
After Conflict-Lessons from Iraq by Larry Diamond, Journal of
Democracy-January 2005; The Present at the Disintegration, by Kanan
Makiya. ..)
|
